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FREDERICKS V. EIDE-KIRSCHMANN FORD: THE VEHICLE
TO ENFORCING TRIBAL COURT CIVIL JUDGMENTS
JON

J.

JENSEN*

Most practitioners will admit, if not readily acknowledge, that
their interest in Indian law is limited.1 With the twilight debates
which echoed off the law school walls long since past, the general
practitioner has left the questions of tribal court sovereignty and
jurisdiction to the occasional specialist and those of us with a genuine interest. When these subjects do arise it is most likely to concern a comparison of state, federal and tribal criminal jurisdiction
because of the increased publicity and interest that such actions
2
tend to receive.

* Associate with the firm of Pearson, Christensen, Larivee & Fischer, Grand Forks,
North Dakota; J.D., University of North Dakota, 1990; B.S. Accounting, Mankato State
University, 1987.
1. For an excellent overview of Indian law, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN

LAW (1982 ed.); W.C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN

INDIAN

LAW IN A

NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988).
In North Dakota the general practitioner's civil exposure to tribal court may likely be
collection matters. See generally Jesse C. Trentadue, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over
Collection Suits By Local Merchants and Lenders: An Obstacle to Creditfor Reservation
Indians?, 13 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1987-88). Non-Indian creditors asserting an action
against an Indian debtor may be required to bring their action in tribal court. Id. at 31.
When the debtor is a tribal member and the debt arose on the reservation, a
collection suit cannot be brought in state court. Likewise, if the collateral is
personal property located on the reservation, state courts are without the
authority to compel its return.... If land is pledged as security for the debt, and
this is Indian-owned and lying within a reservation's boundaries, North Dakota
courts have no jurisdiction over the property.
Id. at 28 n.175 (citations omitted).
2. Congress has been provided with the complete control over regulating Indian affairs
through the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. Control over criminal jurisdiction has been codified in the Indian Country Crimes Act
and the Indian Major Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). The
Indian Country Crimes Act establishes federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes occurring
in Indian Country. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988). The Assimilative Crimes Act allows federal
authorities to use state criminal law to prosecute crimes occurring in Indian country where
there are no applicable federal laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). Federal jurisdiction over
thirteen major crimes is established by the Indian Major Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1988). For a brief overview of federal criminal jurisdiction, see Frank Pommersheim, The
Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of TribalJurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 33233 (1989).
Tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants where federal
jurisdiction has not been mandated by the Indian Country Crimes Act or the Major Crimes
Act. Id. at 333. Tribal court jurisdiction extends only over members of the tribe. United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). Tribal courts are precluded from exercising
any criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 435 U.S.
191 (1978). Tribal courts are further precluded from exercising criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
The extent of state jurisdiction over criminal acts occurring on the reservation is well
defined. States only have criminal jurisdiction over offenses involving Indians if such
jurisdiction has been expressly granted to the state by the federal government. E.g., Solem
v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984). Without a delegation of jurisdiction by the Indian
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Occasionally, a decision will be rendered in an Indian law case
which should be noted by the bar as a whole.' Generally, these
"noteworthy" cases involve criminal jurisdiction4 and it is only
rarely that such a case addresses questions of civil law.5 The North
Dakota Supreme Court's recent decision in Fredericks v. EideKirschmann Ford6 is one such noteworthy decision in the area of
civil jurisdiction.'
This article will attempt to provide a broad overview of the
Fredericksopinion. First, this article will provide a brief discussion
of the origins and parameters of tribal civil jurisdiction. Second,
the legal concept of comity and its application to tribal court jurisdiction will be addressed. Third, the Fredericksdecision itself will
be analyzed.
I. JURISDICTIONAL OVERVIEW8
A.

CASE LAW

The foundation of modern tribal jurisdiction can be traced to
tribe to the state, state jurisdiction over criminal offenses is limited to victimless crimes by
non-Indians and crimes involving only non-Indian perpetrators and victims. Id.
3. Although most practitioners do not spend a great deal of time or energy analyzing
each Indian law decision which is written, this is not to imply that some Indian law cases are
not important; but rather, as with any area of the law, some decisions have a greater scope
of impact than other decisions. Considering that there are five Indian reservations located
completely or partially within the State of North Dakota, it is likely that the average general
practitioner in North Dakota has a greater interest in and understanding of Indian law than
practitioners from other states. Trentadue, supra note 1, at 12 (citing U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Supplementary Report, American Indian Areas and Alaska Native Villages: 1980
Census of Population 24 (1984)). The following Indian reservations are located entirely or
partially within North Dakota: Fort Berthold, Fort Totten, Standing Rock, Turtle Mountain
and Sisseton-Wahpeton. Id.
4. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 676 (finding that tribal courts have no criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians); Oliphant,435 U.S. at 191 (stating that tribal courts
do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th
Cir. 1974) (noting that tribal criminal jurisdiction over members of the tribe extends to
offenses committed off the reservation if the offense effects tribal rights or powers).
5. While criminal jurisdiction is largely governed by federal statutes, civil jurisdiction is
not, and therefore, the contours of civil jurisdiction are less clear. Pommersheim, supra
note 2, at 334.
6. 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990).
7. Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990). There are a
number of other recent North Dakota Supreme Court decisions which should also be noted.
A sampling of other recent North Dakota Supreme Court opinions would include the
following: State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1991) (stating that a federal statute gave
North Dakota State "criminal jurisdiction over the non-major offenses commited by or
against Indians on the Devils Lake Indian Reservation"); Davis v. Director, N.D. Dep't of
Transp., 467 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1991) (finding that state highways within reservation are
part of the reservation and as such are not subject to state jurisdiction); Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 392 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1986) (acceptance of state jurisdiction
over claims arising in Indian country following remand from the United States Supreme
Court).
8. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 122-50; Sandra Hansen, Survey of CivilJurisdictionin
Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319 (1991). In addition to providing an
excellent overview of civil jurisdiction, Sandra Hansen provides an insightful look at the
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three United States Supreme Court cases which were decided in
the mid-1800's. 9 These three opinions were the initial test of how
the United States Supreme Court was going to balance tribal interest in self-government and the perceived necessity of limiting
external tribal power.10
The principles enunciated in the "original" case law can be
divided into two broad categories: 1) the establishment of a dominant federal government role and 2) the protection of tribal selfgovernment. Included within the first broad category, establishing a dominant federal government role, is the principle that federal statutes regulating the tribes and treaties with the tribes
prevail over state laws. 1 Also included in this broad category is
the requirement that the tribes recognize the supremacy and
12
exclusive dominance of the United States.
The second broad category of principles enunciated in the
"original" case law is the establishment of the federal government's commitment to protecting the self-government of the
tribes. 13 This category included the recognition of the right to
self-govern all land reserved to the tribes, subject to federal
origins of Indian "judicial" traditions. Id. at 319-20. It is also interesting to note that there
are great differences between what many Indians consider self-government and the
concept of self-government established by federal policy. See, e.g., Michael M. Pacheco,
FinalityIn Indian Tribunal Decisions: Respecting Our Brothers' Vision, 16 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 119 (1991). Excellent discussions of the enforcement of judgments across reservation
boundaries can be found in Fred L. Ragsdale, Problemsin the Application of FullFaith and
CreditforlndianTribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977); William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courtsand
"Territories" Is Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REV. 219 (1987).
9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The principles
outlined in these three cases have been consistently followed. Felix S. Cohen, Indian
Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 149 (1940).
10. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (formal recognition
of tribal sovereignty). The recognition of tribal sovereignty has gradually eroded since the
United States Supreme Court opinion in Worcester. See Pacheco, supra note 8, at 124-26.
11. Worcester,31 U.S. at 561 (initial determination that the federal government would
have dominant authority over Indian tribes). The United States Supreme Court "has never
held a federal Indian statute or treaty to be an invasion of state authority, and on several
occasions it has reversed contrary holdings of lower courts." Hansen, supra note 8, at 321
n.17 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) as an example).
12. Treaties with the Indian Tribes often included a provision which required the
tribes to acknowledge the United States as the exclusive provider of protection. See
Hansen, supra note 8, at 321-22 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551-52). Subsequent treaties
included specific language which acknowledged the tribes "dependence on the
government of the United States" and acknowledging the "supremacy" of the United
States. Id. at 322 n.19.
13. See generally Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515. In Worcester, the United States Supreme
Court first recognized tribal sovereignty by recognizing the sovereignty of the Cherokees.
Id. The Supreme Court subsequently recognized that Indian sovereignty does not stem
from the United States Constitution nor is it a product of federal regulation. See Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1978).
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authority.' 4 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court articulated a policy of construing treaties and statutes in favor of retaining and protecting tribal self-government. 15
B.

STATUTES

The most important federal statute concerning civil jurisdiction is Public Law 83-280.16 Initially, Public Law 280 provided
that six states were required to assume some form of civil jurisdiction.' 7 All other states were given the option of accepting civil
jurisdiction.'" Public Law 280 was modified in 1968 to require the
consent of a majority of a tribe's enrolled members prior to any
assertion of state civil jurisdiction over the tribe.'
North Dakota initially opted to assert jurisdiction over actions
between members of the tribes and non-members occurring on
tribal land.20 However, in 1963, the North Dakota Legislature
14. See generally Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61 (tribal right to complete use of their
lands). "[T]he reservation to tribes of federally protected territory is intended for the
Indians' economic self-support as well as their continued self-government." Hansen, supra
note 8, at 323.
15. See Allison M. Dussias, Note, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Civil Disputes
Involving Non-Indians An Assessment of NationalFarmers Union InsuranceCos. v. Crow
Tribe ofIndians and a Proposalfor Reform, 20 J. L. REFORM 217, 224 n.62 (1986); COHEN,
supra note 1, at 222 ("that treaties be liberally construed to favor Indians, that ambiguous
expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor of the Indians, and that treaties should be
construed as the Indians would have understood them."). The United States has assumed a
fiduciary relationship with the Indian tribes and any exercise of authority by the United
States must be rationally related to its obligation to guarantee the security and integrity of
the tribes as independent sovereignties. Id. at 223-24.
16. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)). There are a number of
excellent articles discussing Public Law 280, one of which is Hansen, supra note 8, at 335-41
(citing Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: Limits of StateJurisdictionOver Reservation
Indians,22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975)).
17. Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin were initially
granted civil and criminal jurisdiction. See Trentadue, supra note 1, at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1982) (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982) (civil jurisdiction)). Alaska was
not initially required to assume jurisdiction but pursuant to Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988)),
mandatory jurisdiction was assumed by Alaska. Hansen, supra note 8, at 340-41.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1983) (assumption of criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1982) (assumption of civil jurisdiction). Ten states affirmatively accepted jurisdiction over
Indian country. Hansen, supra note 8, at 340. These ten states were Arizona, Florida,
Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Washington. Id. at
n.124. (providing an excellent overview of the extent of jurisdiction assumed by each state
and the individual state codification of the assumption of jurisdiction). See also N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 27-19 (1991).
19. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 402, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1322 (1988)); Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 80 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1326 (1988)).
20. See Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957). Vermillion involved a
personal injury action arising between two Indians on the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation. Id. at 433. The District Court for Burleigh County certified a question of law
asking "whether or not the district had jurisdiction to determine a civil cause of action
arising in tort between enrolled Indians residing within the boundaries of an Indian
Reservation where the cause of action arose within said reservation." Id. Relying on case
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enacted chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
provided that the consent of the tribe was required prior to the

assertion of state jurisdiction. 2 ' The 1963 enactment of a state
statutory requirement of consent to jurisdiction, coupled with the
similar changes to Public Law 280 in 1968, persuaded the North

Dakota Supreme Court that North Dakota could no longer assert
jurisdiction over claims arising on tribal lands.22 Subsequently, the
United States Supreme Court held that North Dakota cannot disclaim jurisdiction over such civil action. 2 ' Therefore, North
law from states with identical provisions of the Enabling Act under which North Dakota
was admitted to the Union, i.e. Montana, New Mexico and Oklahoma, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that North Dakota Courts would have such jurisdiction. Id. at 437-38.
The North Dakota Supreme Court's holding was based upon a determination that Indians
were residents of North Dakota and as such the courts of this state were open to them for
prosecution of civil claims pursuant to Article I, Section 22 of the North Dakota
Constitution. Id. The compact created by section 4 of the Enabling Act and the disclaimer
in section 203 of the North Dakota Constitution only prevented North Dakota Courts from
exercising civil jurisdiction over questions involving the title to land. Id.
21. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19. See infra note 22, discussing the validity of section
27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code.
22. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973). The Gourneau decision
reaffirmed previous North Dakota rulings that the Vermillion decision was no longer
applicable as a result of the enactment of chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code.
Id. at 258.
The initial North Dakota case recognizing that Indian consent was required prior to
state assumption of civil jurisdiction over Indian lands was In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d
694 (N.D. 1963), in which the court held that section 27-19-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code acted as a complete disclaimer of state jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising
on Indian Lands unless the tribe had accepted jurisdiction in the manner provided by the
statute. Id. at 698.
The court in Gourneau did not reject the analysis articulated in the Vermillion
decision, but noted that although Indians are residents of the state, "Federal law prohibits
State courts from assuming jurisdiction of civil actions involving Indians..." and which
arise on Indian Land unless the tribe has previously consented to the exercise of state civil
jurisdiction. Gourneau, 207 N.W.2d at 259.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that federal law rendered section 27-19-05
of the North Dakota Century Code invalid as a method for obtaining state jurisdiction over
Indian country. Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). "[S]tate jurisdiction over
Indian Country may be obtained only by state and tribal compliance with Public Law 90284, §§ 402 and 406." Id. at 57. See also Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 647
(N.D. 1974) (section 27-19-05 is "probably" ineffective).
23. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C.,
476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986). The North Dakota Supreme Court initially held that the courts of
North Dakota did not have jurisdiction to hear an action brought by the Three Affiliated
Tribes. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C.,
321 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1982). The United States Supreme Court, upon reviewing the initial
North Dakota decision, vacated the North Dakota judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984). Upon reconsideration, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the action could be brought in state court if the tribe complied with the
provisions of section 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code but also held that section
27-19-05 eliminated any residual jurisdiction. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985), rev'd 476 U.S. 877
(1986). Again the case was brought before the United States Supreme Court. Three
Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 877. This time the United States Supreme Court unequivocally
held that North Dakota could not disclaim jurisdiction over such suits, and reversed and
remanded the case back to the North Dakota Supreme Court for further proceeding
consistent with its opinion. Id. at 887, 892. The North Dakota Supreme Court then
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Dakota initially asserted jurisdiction, then denied jurisdiction, and
now has been precluded from denying jurisdiction.
C.

SUMMARY

For the purposes of this discussion, the extent of state jurisdiction over claims arising in Indian country may seem to be of little
importance. In considering the effect that the enforcement of tribal court decisions by North Dakota courts will have, it is more
important to define the limits of tribal jurisdiction. However, it is
important for the reader to understand the development of state
involvement in jurisdictional issues. The North Dakota Supreme
Court's decisions indicate a desire to "protect" the citizens of the
state while remaining within federally mandated rules. When
reviewing the North Dakota Supreme Court's application of state
jurisdiction over claims arising in Indian country, I question
whether the court will apply comity without concern for the identity of the promulgating forum or whether the court will choose to
proceed with a "helping hand" for the tribal courts. The Fredericks decision seems to indicate that the North Dakota Supreme
Court may apply a heightened scrutiny in the application of com24
ity to tribal judgments.

Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that Indian tribes may assert sovereignty over their
enrolled members and their property.2" The Court has also consistently construed federal statutes, treaties and executive orders
to protect the self-government rights of the tribe.26 Essentially,
tribal courts retain sovereignty over all matters which have not
been withdrawn by federal treaty or statute.2 It is within this
framework that tribal courts may assert jurisdiction and establish
courts for the resolution of civil claims.
recognized the second opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 392 N.W.2d 87 (N.D.
1986).
Interestingly, Justice Vogel anticipated the implementation of "residual jurisdiction" in
a 1975 North Dakota decision. See Nelson, 232 N.W.2d at 59-61 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
24. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
25. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1932). States generally do not have any
legislative or judicial authority in Indian country. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Backer,
448 U.S. 136 (1980). State authority only extends to reservations where there is specific
regulation. See Pommersheim, supra note 2, at 334 n.47. See also Dussias, supra note 15, at
221-224.
26. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973)
(precluding the implementation of state taxes on reservation). See also Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1978).
27. See Dussias, supra note 15, at 220.
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COMITY

Comity has been characterized as the voluntary recognition
and enforcement of foreign laws in which the rights of individuals
are determined.2" Comity is "a willingness to grant a privilege
not
'29

as a matter of right but out of deference and good will.

There are four basic procedural requirements which must be

satisfied to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment under the
concept of comity. 30 These four requirements can be described as
follows:
1) The foreign court must have jurisdiction over the

cause of action;
2) the

foreign

judgment

must

not

be

obtained

fraudulently;
3) the foreign court must allow all parties to adequately
protect themselves by providing each with an opportu-

nity to offer evidence; and
4) the foreign court must provide an impartial hearing
which satisfies fundamental due process requirements. 31
If foreign judgments meet all four of the above requirements, they
will be enforced by a court of this state.
At this point it is important to distinguish between comity and
the enforcement of judgments through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution.32 A foreign judgment
issued by an Indian tribunal or a foreign country is not included
within chapter 28-20.1 of the North Dakota Century Code which
governs the enforcement of foreign judgements through the principles of full faith and credit. 33 "Foreign judgments" as defined
under chapter 28-20.1 refers only to judgments of other states or
28. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D.
1977); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 740 (S.D. 1985). See generally Frederic
Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court System, 38
UCLA L. REV. 991, 1003 (1991).
29. Lohnes, 254 N.W.2d at 433.
30. See generally Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205-06. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
summarized the elements of the "Hilton" test as outlined in the text. See Malaterre v.
Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980); Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241
(N.D. 1980).
31. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d at 245 (citing Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn.
1976).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1. Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution is
known as the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and reads: "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
33. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d at 246.
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the United States.3 4 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
recognized that the principle of comity is the only method of evaluating foreign country judgments and that there are no other provisions of law which would pertain to judgments of foreign
countries.3 5
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine of comity to the evaluation of tribal judgments, the court
has been reluctant to extend its recognition of the tribes sovereignty to the status of a foreign country. 6 Instead, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has characterized the tribes as "quasi-sovereign entities,13 7 with tribal sovereignty existing only to the
extent that such sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal
treaties or statutes. 3 Therefore, it is ironic that the North Dakota
Supreme Court has elected to apply comity, an analytical tool used
in the recognition of foreign judgments in suits between citizens of
several nations, to enforce tribal judgments which it recognizes as
only "quasi-sovereign entities."3 9 It appears that this "quasi-sovereign" status has left North Dakota courts with an option to pick
and choose when to apply principles relating to a sovereign entity
and when to apply rules relating to a non-sovereign entity.
North Dakota is not alone in its application of comity to tribal
court judgments. South Dakota, Arizona and Montana courts have
also applied the principles of comity to tribal judgments.4 °
III. ANALYSIS OF FREDERICKS V. EIDE-KIRSCHMANN
FORD
On May 14, 1983, Shawn D. Fredericks ("Shawn") purchased
34. Id. (citing Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1977)). Section 28-20.1-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code defines "foreign judgment" as "any judgment, decree, or
order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20.1-01 (1991).
35. Eralp,290 N.W.2d at 246. In Eralp,the North Dakota Supreme Court noted: "We
are not aware of any other provision of law which pertains to foreign judgments or to
judgments of foreign countries, and, for that matter, none has been called to our attention."
Id.
36. See Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164, 167 (N.D. 1990). The
court in Fredericks drew a distinction between a "foreign nation" and an "Indian nation."
Id. This distinction was based primarily on the court's recognition that tribal sovereignty
may be limited by the federal government. Id.
37. Lohnes, 254 N.W.2d at 433.
38. Fredericks,462 N.W.2d at 167 (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 14
(1987)).
39. Id.
40. Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512, 515 (Mont. 1982); In re Marriage of
Limpy, 636 P.2d 266, 267 (Mont. 1981); State v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290, 292 (Mont.
1980); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918, 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Mexican v. Circle
Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 741 (S.D. 1985); One Feather v. O.S.T. Public Safety Comm'n, 482
N.W.2d 48, 49 (S.D. 1992).
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a pickup from Eide-Kirschmann Ford ("Eide").4 t The pickup was
purchased for $14,856 with a down payment of $3,721.35 and the
remaining $11,134.75 balance, with interest, was payable in four
annual installments. 4 2 The sales contract was co-signed by John
Fredericks, Jr. ("John"). 43 Both Shawn and John live on the Fort
Berthold Reservation and are enrolled members of the Three Affiliated Tribes.4 4
. Upon Shawn's failure to make the initial annual financing payment, Eide initiated an action in tribal court to recover the outstanding balance and repossess and sell the vehicle to satisfy the
debt. 45 Eide also filed a motion seeking immediate seizure of the
pickup.46 Prior to any ruling on Eide's motion to repossess, Eide
seized the pickup while it was parked off the reservation.47 Eide
then sent a letter to the clerk of the tribal court to confirm its
intention to continue with the tribal court proceedings even
though it had already seized the pickup. 48 Subsequently, the tribal court issued a show cause order to Shawn, justifying why Eide
would not be entitled to repossess the pickup.4 9
A hearing was held on December 21, 1984, at which time
Eide moved to amend its complaint to include John as a defendant
with Shawn.5 0 On January 18, 1985, the tribal court issued a memorandum opinion in which it concluded that Eide's repossession of
the pickup violated the tribal repossession statute. 51
41. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 165.
42. Id.
43. Id. John Fredericks signed the contract as a "second buyer." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The action was initiated by a summons and complaint dated September 12,
1984. Id.
46. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 165.
47. Id. Eide repossessed the pickup while it was in Bismarck, North Dakota, through
self-help procedures. Id.
48. Id. The letter was dated October 9, 1984. Id.
49. Id. The order to show cause was issued on October 23, 1984, and was directed to
Shawn to show cause as to why Eide should not be allowed immediate possession of the
pickup. Id.

50. Id. A subsequent amended summons and complaint was filed with the tribal court
on January 9, 1985. Id. On January 10, 1985, Eide filed a pretrial brief repeating its request
for possession and sale of the pickup, and further requesting that it be allowed to execute on

any remaining balance after the proceeds of the sale had been applied to the judgment. Id.
51. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 165. The tribal court decided to allow the parties to file
post-trial briefs on the issue of damages. Id. at 165-66. In its post-trial brief, Eide asserted
that it had not violated the tribal repossession statute. Id. at 166. The pertinent part of the
tribal repossession statute reads:
"The personal property of any Indian shall not be taken from within the
exterior boundaries of the Fort Berthold Reservation under procedures of
repossession, except in strict compliance with the following prescribed
procedures:
"(1) Written consent to repossess such property from within the exterior
boundaries of the Reservation shall be secured by the creditor from the Indian
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On April 25, 1985, the tribal court issued an order directing
Eide to return the vehicle to Shawn.5 2 Eide was also required to

account for the lost fair use of the vehicle at a rate of ten dollars
per day from the date of the seizure until its return, attorney's

fees, costs, and was further required to prepare a new sales contract to be signed by Shawn and not by John. 3
Eide appealed the tribal court decision to the Intertribal
Court of Appeals.5 4 Eide then sold the pickup on November 25,
1985. 5 ' The Intertribal Court of Appeals warned Eide to file a

brief, but because Eide indicated that it no longer wished to pursue the appeal, the Intertribal Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal, directed Eide to return the pickup as ordered by the tribal
court and remanded the case back to the tribal court for further
proceedings consistent with the tribal court's April 25, 1985,
judgment. 6

Shawn moved to amend the trial court's order on February
11, 1986, seeking attorney's fees and damages from Eide's sale of
the pickup.57 The court issued a show cause order demanding that
Eide justify why such relief should not be granted. 8 Eide did not

respond to the order and the tribal court issued an amended judgment on December 30, 1986.5 9 Eide was subsequently served
with notice of entry of judgment and on May 3, 1989, Shawn com-

purchaser thereof at the time the repossession at issue is sought. Such written
consent shall be retained by the creditor and exhibited to the Fort Berthold
Tribal Court upon proper demand.
"(2) In the absence of such written consent, repossession shall be lawfully
perfected by the creditor only obtaining an order authorizing and directing such
repossession issued by the Fort Berthold Tribal Court in an appropriate legal
proceeding."
Id. at 165-66 n.2.
52. Id. at 166.
53. Id. Costs included telephone calls in the amount of $838.00. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 166. Eide was ordered to file appellant brief by
September 30, 1985. Id. In a second order by the Intertribal Court of Appeals, it was
recognized that Eide had "failed to file the Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 4(c)," and the
Intertribal Court of Appeals further noted that on October 15, 1985 counsel for Eide had
indicated that Eide no longer wished to pursue the appeal. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The tribal court issued the following amended judgment:
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menced an action in the district court.6 ° Both parties moved for
summary judgment. 6 Eide was granted summary judgment and
Shawn's motion for summary judgment to enforce the tribal court
judgment was denied.62 Shawn appealed the decision to the
North Dakota Supreme Court.6 3
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its opinion by examining the general principles of comity.' Relying on the United
States Supreme Court decision of Hilton v. Guyot,6 5 the court out-

lined several factors to be considered in determining whether the
tribal court decision should be recognized by the courts of this
state. 6
After implicitly concluding that the general factors warranted
enforcement of the tribal court judgment, the court turned its
attention to defining the difference between judgments of "foreign nations," judgments which are recognized to be enforceable
through the use of the comity doctrine, and judgments of "Indian
nations. "67 In concluding that Indian judgments could be
enforced in a manner similar to foreign judgments, the court
stated that "[w]e consider an 'Indian nation' as equivalent to a 'foreign nation' to encourage reciprocal action by the Indian tribes in
this state and ultimately, to better
relations between the tribes and
68
the State of North Dakota.

The court then addressed Eide's challenges to the enforcement of the tribal court judgment.6 9 Eide's first challenge was to
the tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction. 70 The court dis"1.

Court Order of April 25, 1985:
"A. Mileage
$ 288.00
"B. Attorney Fees
$ 500.00
"C. Phone Calls
$ 50.00
"D. $10 per day loss of use from October of 1984 to April of
1986
$ 5450.00
"2.
Loss of Down Payment
$ 3721.00
"3.
Exemplary (punitive) Damages resulting in [sic] sale of vehicle
in direct violation of Court's Order of April 25, 1985
$15000.00
"TOTAL OF ALL DAMAGES
$25009.00
"Interest per Tribal Code 10% from date of April 25, 1985"
Id. (quoting from the tribal court amended judgment).
60. Id.
61. Fredericks,462 N.W.2d at 166.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 167.
65. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
66. Fredericks,462 N.W.2d at 167 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205-06).
67. Id. The Court discussed the requirements of comity and then began evaluating
Eide's assertions and challenges to the implementation of comity. Id. at 167-71.
68. Id. at 168.
69. Id. at 167-71.
70. ld. at 168.
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missed this argument on the basis that jurisdiction of a foreign
court is presumed, 7 ' Eide consented to tribal court jurisdiction,72
73
and the tribal constitution provided for jurisdiction.
Eide's second challenge was that the tribal court erred in its
implementation of the tribal repossession statute. 7 4 The court dismissed this challenge by noting that Eide's remedy was with the
Intertribal Court of Appeals and that Eide should have thoroughly
pursued a remedy in that forum.7 5
Eide then challenged the tribal court judgment on the
grounds that the North Dakota Legislature had not yet indicated a
level of confidence in the tribal courts sufficient to warrant
enforcement of a tribal judgment. 76 Eide argued that because section 27-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code requires a tribal
judge to be a graduate of an accredited law school and hold a
license to practice in at least one state prior to enforcement of a
tribal "family law" judgment, the judgment in the case at hand
should not be enforced. 7 7 The court found section 27-01-09 to be
71. Fredericks,462 N.W.2d at 168 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166-67).
72. Id. Eide consented to tribal court jurisdiction by initiating the action in tribal
court. Id. Eide continued to assent to tribal jurisdiction by pressing its claim for a money
judgment after it had seized the pickup. Id.
73. Id. "We note that Constitution and By-Laws of the Three Affiliated Tribes, Ch. 1,
Subch. 3, § 2(a) provides:
"a. Jurisdiction. The Tribal Court ... shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over:
(2) All civil actions where the cause of action arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts, or in [sic] the property to be affected lies within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts; and, those cases where the parties have
consented to tribal court jurisdiction in writing, by conduct, or by contract.'"
Id.
74. Id. at 168-69.
75. Id. Quoting from Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987), the
Court recognized that Eide's failure to allow the tribal court system a full opportunity to
review the judgment precluded Eide from challenging the trial court's implementation of
the tribal statute in North Dakota state courts. Id. at 169. Eide had in effect deprived the
tribal court system an opportunity to rectify any errors. Id.
76. Fredericks,462 N.W.2d at 169.
77. Id. Section 27-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code applies specifically to
"family law" judgments and orders rendered by the tribal courts for the Three Affiliated
Tribes. Section 27-01-09 states:
The district courts and county courts shall recognize and cause to be enforced
any judgment, decree, or order of the tribal court of the Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold Reservation in any case involving the dissolution of
marriage, the distribution of property upon divorce, child custody, adoption, and
adult abuse protection order, or an adjudication of the delinquency,
dependency, or neglect of Indian children if the tribal court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the judgment, decree, or order. The tribal court
judgment, decree, or order must be rendered by a judge who is a graduate of an
accredited law school and holds a current valid license to practice law in at least
one state. A state court may inquire as to the facts of the case or tribal law only
to the extent necessary to determine whether the tribal court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the judgment, decree, or order and personal
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inapplicable and only an example of mandatory recognition
which
78
did not bar voluntary recognition as a matter of comity.
Eide's final challenges were directed at the merits of the tribal
decision.7 9 While the court did address the specific issue of
whether punitive damages would have been applicable under
North Dakota law for the improper repossession of the pickup, the
court declined to address the merits of the action because Eide
had failed to show prejudice, fraud or any other reason why comity should not be granted.8 °
The court concluded by stating that Eide had failed to overcome the presumption that the tribal court had jurisdiction. 8 '
The court also stated the following:
It appears to us that the tribal court judgment sought
to be enforced was "rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon
due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend
against them" and that the tribal court's "proceedings are
according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence,
and
82
are stated in a clear and formal record.
The court then held that the district court had erred in failing to
enforce the tribal judgment as a matter of comity and reversed the
judgment of the district court, remanding the matter
for entry of
83
judgment enforcing the tribal court judgment.
It is foreseeable that a fair number of general practitioners in
North Dakota will encounter a situation where they are asked to
either enforce or defend against the recognition of a tribal court
decision by the courts of the State of North Dakota. Knowledge of
jurisdiction over the parties to the action. Recognition and enforcement of tribal

court judgments, decrees, and orders under this section is conditioned upon
recognition and enforcement of state court judgments, decrees, and orders by
the tribal court of the Three Affiliated Tribes and tribal law enforcement
agencies under the same limitations provided by this section for recognition and
enforcement of tribal court judgments, decrees, and orders by state courts.
N.D. CENT.CODE § 27-01-09 (1991).

In Fredericks,the court concluded that section 27-01-09 was an example of mandatory
recognition, regardless of the doctrine of comity. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 169. Section
27-01-09 did not, therefore, preclude recognition under the comity doctrine. Id.
78. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 169. The court further found that the doctrine of comity
does not depend upon the mutual or reciprocal enforcement of judgments of this state by
the "foreign" entity. Id. (citing Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 246 (N.D.
1980).
79. Id. at 169-71.
80. Id. at 170 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895)).
81. Id.
82. Id.at 170-71 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205-06).
83. Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 171.
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the boundaries of both state and tribal jurisdiction is essential to
the application of comity. The requirement that the original court
have jurisdiction over the action is a primary element of comity.
The decision in Fredericksis both enlightening and discouraging. On the one hand, it is encouraging to see state tribunals
attempt to look beyond the racial barriers which once would have
prevented the enforcement of a tribal decision. However, by
applying the doctrine of comity, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has resolved the question of whether tribal court judgments
should be enforced by determining whether or not the tribal judgment meets traditional Anglo-justice principles. While the Fredericks decision can be viewed as a cornerstone for future
enforcement of tribal decisions, it is clear that future applications
of comity will require the tribes to develop courts which comply
with Anglo-justice principles."4 As Justice Vande Walle stated in
his concurring opinion in Fredericks:
One of the witnesses before the House Judiciary Committee which considered the legislation, in response to a
question from a member of the committee, indicated that
the other tribes do not have law-trained judges and an
appellate procedure which would meet the requirements
necessary to grant recognition to the judgments of those
tribal courts. If that situation still exists, our opinion today
should not be considered a carte blanche invitation to recognition of judgments of those tribal courts by the North
Dakota courts.8 5
Has the court taken a step forward or has it 8actually
continued the
6
self-government?
Indian
eroding
of
process

84. See id. at 171-72 (Vande Walle, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 172 (Vande Walle, J., concurring).
86. Many recent articles have been written regarding the continued erosion of Indian
self-government. Two excellent articles are Michael M. Pacheco, Finality In Indian
Tribunal Decisions: Respecting Our Brothers' Vision, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 119 (1991);
Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries:
Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 589 (1990).

